This month marks the 40th anniversary of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. The Tet Offensive was an attempt by communist forces throughout the country to weaken American resolve during the Vietnamese New Year in 1968. On a tactical level the Communist forces were devastated. For a rare moment in the war the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) came out of the shadows where they were ground down by superior American firepower. On a strategic level, however, the Tet Offensive proved to be the turning point that tilted the war in favor of the Communists. The images that were beamed back to American televisions revealed an enemy that did not appear defeated as the then commanding general Westmoreland had bellowed. On the contrary, as the US Embassy was breached it gave the impression the US presence there was under siege. The years that followed saw some of the most deadly fighting of the war. Soon the policy of Vietnamization was the concept that would provide a way out for the US. Handing over the war to the South Vietnamese while the US withdrew proved flawed and fatal for a free, pro-western government in Saigon.

We face a similar decision in Iraq forty years after the Tet Offensive. Bush’s policy has been to “stand down when the Iraqis are able to stand up”.  Joseph Galloway writes in the Miami Herald about death squads in Iraq and how they are attempting to kill the head of the snakes that have stepped up to fight Al-Qaeda forces. There is also tensions within Iraq between the Sunni tribes and the Shia majority. If Moqtada Al-Sadr resumes his campaign against the Sunni in the coming months or years Iraq will again descend into chaos. Currently we are arming and training the Iraqi army which is made up of mostly Shia Muslims. We are also arming and financing the Sunni militia and their new “Awakening Councils” that are currently battling Al-Qaeda in Iraq forces. This has become the equivalent of our Vietnamization policy in Iraq. The difference is we are in effect arming both sides of the divide in the hope that there will be reconciliation. But what will  happen if the two sides slip away from each other. With training, arms and religious fervor a new stage in the history of Iraq would be like the Lebanon civil war on steroids. We are pinning our hopes on the new Iraqi government and the bravery of US soldiers. Like in Vietnam, an early withdrawal means almost certainly that Iraq will fail. But a continued US commitment does not guarantee success there.

We study history for a reason. The true lessons that can be learned from both conflicts is not to enter into war when we don’t understand the dynamics of the nation we have invaded and, when either nationalism and/or religion are in the mix the result of the war will never be assured. Finally, when the government we are supporting is weak only a continued presence by American forces will make victory a possibility. The question for both wars is how long will it take for the host nation to take over the mantle of power?

We know what happened in Vietnam. We did not continue the commitment for viable reasons and the nation along with large portions of Southeast Asia flowed red under communist rule. In Iraq, the enemy and the conditions are different. There is no political division, but there is an ideological and a sectarian division. Are any of these factions truly on our side? Perhaps one could say the Iraqi government is and if they fail we will lose any influence we may have in Mesopotamia. In essence, if the fledgling Iraqi government fails, we fail. These are the lines that are drawn as we contemplate the implication of the 40th anniversary of the Tet Offensive and the lesson’s we learned from the US policy of Vietnamization and the withdrawal from Vietnam.