There is much talk about Iraq moving off American’s top issues for the 2008 election. American soldiers are still dying, just not like they were before the surge. Iraqis are still dying, just not like they were before the surge. And that is my good news. Juan Cole explains in his blog Informed Commentthe situation away from the surge is not going well at all (click here)
_____________________________________________
Supporting Musharraf reminds me of American Foreign Policy during the Cold War. It wasn’t uncommon for the US to support any leader as long as they were anti-communist. The sentiment now is we support leaders as long as they are anti-terrorist. The President of Pakistan took the reigns of power via a military coup. It is always easier to support a pro-US dictator than it is to support an anti-American democratic leader. Look at the US intervention in Guatemala during the Eisenhower administration. One problem we have with General Musharraf is his government was actively supporting the Taliban and thus Al-Qaeda before 9-11 and we know now there are elements in his government that still share pro Al-Qaeda sentiments. Musharraf has changed his tune and has claimed to have “played ball” with the US. The biggest issue we have, however, is Musharraf has many reasons to not track down and kill Osama Bin Laden. Actually he has billions of reasons in the form of US dollars. If Al-Qaeda was neutralized in Pakistan the US would do what they always do. They would turn their attention elsewhere and take their checkbook with them. Musharraf receives billions of dollars in aid, much of it simply disappears into the oblivion of the corrupt Pakistani government infrastructure with little to show for it. The death of Bhutto has shone a nasty little light into the corner of the world where we should be most active. While the nation has been laboring over the Bush war in Iraq, our policy in the eastern recesses of the Middle East has been festering like a bad sore when the wrong medicine is used. It is a shame it took the death of Benazir Bhutto for the nation to reexamine our relationship with Musharraf and Pakistan but it is one that was a long time in coming. Perhaps the surge in Iraq didn’t allow the Iraqi government to get its act together. Rather, it allowed the US public to take a breath and to reassess its lack of attention to the region of the Middle East that brought us September 11.
“I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.”
I’m sure many have seen the following video as they take in movies this holiday season but I thought it was worthy to post it here for those who have not. On this Christmas Day there are many around the world who miss home and the things we take for granted. May the calm of this day find moments with them.
The surge in Iraq is working…sort of. Part of this is due to US General Patraeus’ strategy to stifle violence in Baghdad; a great military impetus that has wilted militants in the war torn city. The other part is the recognition by Sunnis that Al-Qaeda was not interested in their well being, but instead to a wider goal of inciting civil war, at Iraq’s expense, in order to cripple America’s commitment in the region.
The implementation of the US military’s alliance by necessity with Sunni groups in Al-Anbar has created a long term problem. The US has been arming the tribes there and their power and prestige has risen during this period of optimism and peace known as “The Anbar Awakening”. But like sleeping dogs, sometimes you have to worry what happens after they wake up. The Sunni tribes in Western Iraq have not shown loyalty to the new Iraqi government. Many of those in these Sunni groups were formerly insurgents and some were former Ba’athists, the political party of Saddam Hussein. They may have accepted American assistance for the time being to rid themselves of destructive Al-Qaeda elements but they have not found common ground with the Shia dominated government. The question also arises as to what will happen once Al-Qaeda is no longer present in their sphere. Will the next stage be a renewed war against US interests to remove them also?
In the south the British have left Basra in the hands of local authorities. The British had always played a low key role in security operations in southern Iraq and their handover of authority there has created a power vacuum. Feudalism exists in the land south of Baghdad to the Persian Gulf as numerous factions vie for control of the oil rich territory. The significant entities jockeying for power are the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) party run by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Al-Hakim is said to be the most important figure in Iraq who doesn’t hold a political position in the government. Al Hakim is the last survivor of a family of nine boys. Seven were murdered under Saddam Hussein’s government and the eighth was killed in a car bomb blast in 2003. Al-Hakim met with President Bush this month. The US is working closely with him since they view him as a moderate. Al-Hakim is closely aligned with the moderate cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. ISCI groups reside both within the Iraqi Security forces and as separate militias outside of it. These units are collectively called the Badr Brigades and are considered the armed wing of ISCI.
The second faction in the south is led by Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia is an influential force not only in the Shia dominated south of Iraq but also in the mixed areas farther north. Al-Sadr is the son of the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Mohammed Sadeq Al Sadr who was murdered by Saddam’s men. Moqtada has gained acclaim for supporting the poor in Iraq. His militia, known as the Mahdi Army, has often clashed with the US military throughout the war. Defining his skills as a politician, Sadr has gone back to school to attain the religious title of ayatollah. Ayatollahs have significant authority in Shia Islam. They are able to issue fatwahs (religious rulings) and not have to defer to higher clerics. Al-Sadr already has political assets in the new Iraqi government which enhances his prestige. Al-Sadr has become a bit of a Doppelganger since he can pose as a fighter of foreign imperialists, of Sunni militias, of Ba’athists, and a champion for the poor.
The final entity in southern Iraq is the Islamic Virtues Party or Fadhila Party. Despite the fact that the Fadhila Party was formed from a student of Moqtada Al-Sadr’s father, the Fadhila Party is actually now a rival of the Mahdi Army. The one single thread that ties all the factions together in Shia dominated southern Iraq is conservative Islamic Fundamentalism. Taking their cue from Iran, the various factions in the south have installed a strict Sharia’ based law code throughout the region. The wild card in the region is Iran. Iran wishes to greatly influence the discussion in Iraq. They have armed various Shia factions and have often worked to weaken the sway of the United States commitment in Iraq.
The final region in Iraq is the Kurdish North. I will address their significant problems in the coming days.
Compounding the situation is the role of the national government in Iraq which seems to be toothless in their ability to influence things in either the Sunni dominated Al-Anbar province or the multi-factional Shia dominated south. What this holds for the US occupation is not known. In some ways it appears the US military is but one other faction vying to influence the course of events in Iraq.
In economics there is a concept known as opportunity cost. The general idea of an opportunity cost is if you spend your money on product ‘A’ what products are you then not able to buy since you purchased product ‘A’. We have seen this played out numerous times since the Iraq War began. Since we are spending so much money in Iraq and Afghanistan, what could we have done with that money? Democrats would like to rebuild New Orleans after Katrina, create a state run health care system, or heal the Social Security system. Republicans either don’t question the value of the war or would prefer to pay off the national debt, depending on who you talk to. One thing is obvious, we are not getting good value for our money.
Through the spring of 2007 the war in Iraq was run as poorly as any in our history. Those deserving blame are as abundant as Donald Rumsfeld’s snowflakes. From the CIA’s Curveball to Cheney’s fear mongering. From the Democrat’s Congressional vote to Powell’s vial. From Rumsfeld’s false optimism to Bremer’s debathification policy. Through it all was the poor leadership of the Commander in Chief and the Democrats’ inability to present a strong candidate that could defeat such a weak incumbent in 2004.
In the spring of 2007 there emerged a unique general who has changed the dynamic of the Iraq war. General Petraeus is everything Bush isn’t but he may end up being Bush’s savior. Petraeus is by all accounts one of the most intelligent military minds to bless the Army in some time. He received his doctoral degree with a paper entitled "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam". Prior to being named commanding general of MNF-I (Multinational Forces- Iraq) he co-authored the field manual for counterinsurgency. Despite all the comparisons to the Vietnam conflict, the man who may make the most positive impact knows all about counterinsurgencies. Our failings in Vietnam may end up being our lesson learned in Iraq.
Up until recently, this war did not deserve supporting. Those who led it in Washington and those who initiated strategy in Iraq were drowning in incompetence. The chief architects of this war are gone. Donald Rumsfeld has faded into the dustbin of history along with a vast array of neo-cons. Vice President Cheney has become a silent partner. His role has been filled by moderates such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Diplomacy, that evil word in Bush policies past, has emerged. We know President Bush is a slow learner but in the twilight of his administration it seems the strategy of international relations and conflict management have begun to be understood. It is clear there are significant gains in Iraq and as a liberal one cannot turn their back on a people who have suffered mightily from the rule of a tyrant and the chaos of over four years of war. Whatever you may have felt about the war prior, it is now time to forget the notion of an immediate US pullout. As a liberal, if you damned the Chinese in Tibet or the Sudanese government in Darfur, it is your obligation to support the Iraqis now that progress can finally be measured. The strategy of the surge is to buy the Iraqi government time. That time is now ticking. If they are unable to take advantage of the improved situation on the ground, then it is time to leave. For those that have suffered most, the families of the soldiers and the Iraqis themselves, don’t equate a failure in Iraq as a victory for the left. A failure in Iraq is much more significant than an "I told you so" moment. Failure in Iraq is a tragedy for the Iraqis.
The biggest issue we have, however, is Musharraf has many reasons to not track down and kill Osama Bin Laden. Actually he has billions of reasons in the form of US dollars. If Al-Qaeda was neutralized in Pakistan the US would do what they always do. They would turn their attention elsewhere and take their checkbook with them. Musharraf receives billions of dollars in aid, much of it simply disappears into the oblivion of the corrupt Pakistani government infrastructure with little to show for it. The death of Bhutto has shone a nasty little light into the corner of the world where we should be most active. While the nation has been laboring over the Bush war in Iraq, our policy in the eastern recesses of the Middle East has been festering like a bad sore when the wrong medicine is used. It is a shame it took the death of Benazir Bhutto for the nation to reexamine our relationship with Musharraf and Pakistan but it is one that was a long time in coming. 
Perhaps the surge in Iraq didn’t allow the Iraqi government to get its act together. Rather, it allowed the US public to take a breath and to reassess its lack of attention to the region of the Middle East that brought us September 11.
Al Hakim is the last survivor of a family of nine boys. Seven were murdered under Saddam Hussein’s government and the eighth was killed in a car bomb blast in 2003. Al-Hakim met with President Bush this month. The US is working closely with him since they view him as a moderate. Al-Hakim is closely aligned with the moderate cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. ISCI groups reside both within the Iraqi Security forces and as separate militias outside of it. These units are collectively called the Badr Brigades and are considered the armed wing of ISCI. 
Moqtada has gained acclaim for supporting the poor in Iraq. His militia, known as the Mahdi Army, has often clashed with the US military throughout the war. Defining his skills as a politician, Sadr has gone back to school to attain the religious title of ayatollah. Ayatollahs have significant authority in Shia Islam. They are able to issue fatwahs (religious rulings) and not have to defer to higher clerics. Al-Sadr already has political assets in the new Iraqi government which enhances his prestige. Al-Sadr has become a bit of a Doppelganger since he can pose as a fighter of foreign imperialists, of Sunni militias, of Ba’athists, and a champion for the poor. 
the improved situation on the ground, then it is time to leave. For those that have suffered most, the families of the soldiers and the Iraqis themselves, don’t equate a failure in Iraq as a victory for the left. A failure in Iraq is much more significant than an "I told you so" moment. Failure in Iraq is a tragedy for the Iraqis.
